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I V 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, the court of appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0") (2002). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. 
Appellant Kelly Baker proffered defenses to Appellee Mark Hernandez's claims 
against him that, if proven at trial, would preclude Hernandez from recovering on such 
claims. The first issue presented is whether the trial court correctly ruled Baker is 
without a meritorious defense to Hernandez's claims. 
Standard of Review. Whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75,f12, 11 P.3d 277. 
Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved at R. 182-84, 260-
63,215,336-37. 
n. 
Appellee Mark Hernandez obtained leave to amend his complaint to include 
Appellant Performance Auto as an additional defendant. However, Hernandez did not 
file the amended complaint, nor did he serve the same upon Performance Auto. The 
second issue presented is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter default judgment 
against Performance Auto. 
Standard of Review. A motion to set aside a judgment for lack of jurisdiction is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State Dep't Soc. Servs. v. Viiil 784 
P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved at R. 183-84, 216. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rules that are of central importance to this appeal include the following: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 3(b): 
Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing 
of the complaint or service of the summons and a copy of the complaint. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a): 
Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it 
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b): 
Mistakes: inadvertence: excusable neglect: newly discovered evidence: fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve 
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves an appeal of the trial court's order denying a motion to set aside 
default judgment. While it is typically within a trial court's discretion to grant or deny a 
motion to set aside a default judgment, this case presents two issues that are beyond a 
trial court's discretionary reach. The first issue involves the proper legal standard for 
showing a meritorious defense. The second issue is jurisdictional in nature and involves 
the proper procedure for amending a complaint to add an additional defendant. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This case was filed by Mark Hernandez against Kelly Baker in the Fourth District 
Court for Utah County. Venue was then changed to the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County and assigned to the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod. Hernandez later 
obtained leave to amend his complaint to join Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. 
as a defendant. However, Hernandez never filed the amended complaint nor did he serve 
the same upon Performance Auto. 
During the course of the litigation, Hernandez sought default judgment against 
Baker and Performance Auto as a sanction for their failure to respond to written 
discovery. The trial court granted the motion and defaulted both Baker and Performance 
Auto. Baker and Performance Auto moved to set the judgment aside. The trial court 
denied their motion. 
Baker and Performance Auto appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. Thereafter, 
Hernandez filed a motion for summary disposition under Rule 10(a)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure arguing that the grounds for appeal are so insubstantial as not to 
merit further consideration. The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this 
Court, which denied Hernandez's motion and ordered full briefing of the issues. See 
Hernandez v. Baker et al.. Case No. 20030753-CA (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2003.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp. ("Performance Auto") is a 
Utah corporation. (R. 192-93.) Defendant Kelly Baker ("Baker") is Performance Auto's 
president. (R. 193,234.) 
Sometime in 1995, Plaintiff Mark Hernandez ("Hernandez") took his boat and a 
trailer to Performance Auto to have work performed on the boat's engine. (R. 193, 
201A.) The initial estimate provided to Hernandez for the work was $250. (R. 201 A, 
250.) The actual cost of the repair work exceeded the estimate by $584.72. (R. 225, 282-
83.) 
After the work on Hernandez's boat and engine was complete, Performance Auto 
attempted but was unable to contact Hernandez to advise him of the same. (R. 252, 283.) 
After several months without being able to contact Hernandez, Performance Auto 
exercised its rights under Utah's repairman's lien statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-2-3, -
3.2, and -4 (2001), and sold the boat and the trailer to recoup its parts, labor, and storage 
costs. (R. 283-85, 309.) 
Hernandez later resurfaced and demanded a return of his boat and trailer. (R. 
283.) A dispute ensued between the parties (R. 283-85) and Hernandez filed a verified 
complaint against "Kelly S. Baker, dba Performance Auto & Marine Supply". (R. 1.)l 
In the Verified Complaint, Hernandez alleged: (1) violation of the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act; (2) replevin; (3) conversion/trespass to chattels; and (4) punitive damages. 
(R. 1.) 
Baker answered the Verified Complaint, and asserted that Performance Auto the 
corporation, not Baker the individual, had business dealings with Hernandez. (R. 56.)2 
Thus, Baker denied any personal liability for the claims alleged by Hernandez. (R. 57.) 
In response to Baker's Answer, Hernandez sought leave to amend his complaint to 
include Performance Auto as an additional defendant. (R. 62, 71.) On December 5, 
1
 A copy of the Verified Complaint is attached as Addendum B. 
2
 A copy of the Answer is attached as Addendum C. 
2000, the trial court granted Hernandez's motion for leave to amend. (R. 78.) However, 
Hernandez never filed his amended complaint nor did Hernandez serve the amended 
complaint upon Performance Auto. (R. 183-184.)3 Rather, Performance Auto was 
simply added as a party to the caption of subsequent pleadings. (R. 80 et. seq., 184.) 
Approximately one year after obtaining leave to amend, Hernandez submitted 
written interrogatories and request for production of documents on both Baker and 
Performance Auto. (R. 92-108.) Neither Baker nor Performance Auto responded to this 
discovery. (R. 102, 106.) 
On June 25, 2001, after an apparent lag in the proceedings, the trial court issued a 
notice of order to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. (R. 87.) At the July 31, 2001, order to show cause hearing, the trial court 
gave Hernandez 30 days to file a motion to compel answers to his discovery or request a 
trial setting or the case would be dismissed without further notice. (R. 86.) 
Nearly three months later, on November 1, 2001, Hernandez filed a motion to 
compel pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 89.) On March 11, 
2003, the trial court ordered Baker and Performance Auto to respond to the written 
discovery on or before March 29, 2002. (R. I l l . ) 
3
 A review of the record, including the index and docket entry of the district court clerk therein (R. 
270-72), fails to reveal the filing of an amended complaint or of any proposed amended complaint in 
connection with Hernandez's motion and memorandum for leave to amend. (R. 62, 71,passim.) Nor 
does the record, index, or docket reveal the filing of a return of service for Performance Auto. (R. 
passim.) 
By this time in the litigation, Baker had relocated from Salt Lake City to St. 
George, and had not informed his previous attorney of his move. (R. 177-78.) This was 
a result of representations from his attorney, which caused Baker to believe the case had 
been dismissed as a result ofthe trial court's order to show cause. (R. 177-78.) Thus, 
Baker was unaware ofthe trial court's order compelling answers to the discovery and 
neither Baker nor Performance Auto responded to the same. (R. 115, 123-24.) 
Thereafter Hernandez moved for default. (R. 115, 123-24.) On February 13, 
2003, the trial court entered default judgment in the amount of $52,677.75 against both 
Baker and Performance Auto, jointly and severally. (R. 165-66.) 
On May 1, 2003, Baker and Performance Auto moved to set the judgment aside 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) ofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 172-73.) Baker sought 
to set the judgment aside on the grounds that there was mistake, inadvertence, and/or 
excusable neglect for his failure to answer the discovery requests, that his motion to set 
aside was timely filed, and that he had meritorious defenses to the action. (R. 180-84, 
256-263.) 
Performance Auto sought to set the judgment aside on the grounds that the trial 
court was without jurisdiction over it because, although Hernandez obtained leave of 
court to amend his complaint to include Performance Auto as a party, Hernandez never 
filed the amended complaint, nor did he serve the same upon Performance Auto. (R. 
183-84.) 
In ruling on the motion, the trial court determined that Baker and Performance 
Auto "must show: 1) the default judgment was entered based upon mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) the motion to set aside is timely; and 3 ) . . 
. a meritorious defense." (R. 336-37.)4 
On the issue of Baker's meritorious defenses, trial counsel for both parties argued 
extensively in their written memoranda concerning (1) Baker's individual liability under 
a corporate shield defense and (2) whether the sale of the boat complied with the 
repairman's lien statutes. (R. 182-83, 209, 211-16, 235-37, 260-63, 280-82.) 
The trial court then denied the motion on the grounds that Baker and Performance 
Auto "failed to provide 'specific' and 'detailed' facts necessary to support their 
underlying claim and therefore are unable to set forth the necessary evidence of a 
meritorious defense to the action against them." (R. 337.) Though the issue was placed 
squarely before it, the trial court did not address Performance Auto's jurisdictional 
challenge. (R. 336-37.) 
Baker and Performance Auto appeal. (R. 339.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court denied Baker's motion to set aside solely on the grounds that he 
failed to present a meritorious defense. In denying the motion, the trial court applied a 
meritorious defense standard that necessarily required Baker to prove the merits of his 
4
 A copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached as Addendum A. 
defense. However, to show a meritorious defense, the law merely requires a simple 
determination of whether the defenses proffered, if proven at trial, would preclude 
recovery on the claims asserted by the plaintiff. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, !f28-
29,11 P.3d 277; Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 
1994). 
In the instant case, the defenses proffered by Baker, if proven at trial, would 
preclude recovery on all claims asserted by Hernandez. Therefore, Baker presented a 
meritorious defense as a matter of law. As a result, the trial court's denial of Baker's 
motion to set aside default judgment was incorrect and must be reversed. 
The trial court also denied the motion to set aside with regard to Performance Auto 
on the grounds that it failed to present a meritorious defense. The issue with regard to 
Performance Auto, however, is jurisdictional. Performance Auto was not an original 
party to this action. Hernandez obtained leave to file an amended complaint to include 
Performance Auto as a party. However, Hernandez never filed the amended complaint 
nor did he serve Performance Auto with process. Performance Auto was simply added to 
the caption of the pleadings as the case moved forward, culminating in the trial court's 
entry of a default judgment against it as discovery sanction. 
A trial court does not de facto obtain jurisdiction over a new defendant at the time 
it grants leave to amend the complaint to include the new defendant as a party to the 
action. Rather, the rules of civil procedure and due process require actual filing and 
service of the amended complaint. Because this did not occur in the instant case, the 
default judgment against Performance Auto is void and the trial court must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED BAKER DID NOT 
HAVE A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 
A. Standard for Setting Aside Default Judgment 
To obtain relief from a default judgment a defendant must show: (1) default was 
entered against him for any of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b); (2) his motion to set 
aside the default judgment is timely; and (3) he has a meritorious defense to the action.5 
See Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State ex. rel. Dep't of Social Servs v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053,1055-56 (Utah 
1983) (plurality opinion)). Further, courts should be liberal in applying these standards 
with an eye towards granting relief against default judgments so that cases may be tried 
on the merits. See id. at 1149. 
In the instant case, the trial court correctly articulated this three-part standard. 
However, it then proceeded to deny Baker's motion to set aside because it determined 
that Baker failed to meet the third requirement—that of showing a meritorious defense. 
It should be noted that the standard for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) is the same 
whether the default was the result of a failure to answer a complaint, or, as here, a Rule 37 motion to 
compel. See Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The existence of a meritorious defense only becomes an issue after a trial court is 
satisfied that the first two requirements for setting aside a default judgment have been 
shown. See Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056 (stating it is "unnecessary" and "inappropriate 
[] to consider the issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied that a 
sufficient excuse has been shown."); see also Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. 
Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 387, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (1963) (stating meritorious defense 
question arises only after sufficient excuse is shown). Thus, where, as here, a trial court 
considers the issue of a meritorious defense without specifically ruling on the question of 
whether there was a sufficient excuse under Rule 60(b), the existence of a sufficient 
excuse is implied. See id.6 
Therefore, because the trial court specifically ruled on the issue of Baker's 
meritorious defenses, Baker has satisfied the excuse and timeliness prongs of Rule 60(b). 
The only question is whether Baker presented a meritorious defense as a matter of law. 
B. The Meritorious Defense Standard 
In determining Baker did not have a meritorious defense, the trial court concluded 
"that the defendants have failed to provide 'specific' and 'detailed' facts necessary to 
support their underlying claim and therefore are unable to set forth the necessary 
evidence of a meritorious defense to the action against them." (R. 337; see also Add. A.) 
6
 This was one of the few points of agreement between the five justices in Musselman. See 
Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1058 (Howe, J., concurring), at 1059 (Durham, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stewart, J.) (stating, "I agree with that portion of the opinion which concludes that the appellant has 
met his burden on the issues of timeliness and excusable neglect."). 
In determining whether a defendant has a meritorious defense to the claims against 
him, the central inquiry is whether the defendant can "show" a "proposed defense 
containing allegations, facts, or claims that, if proven at trial, would preclude total or 
partial recovery by [the plaintiff]." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, f28, 11 P.3d 277. 
A party need not actually prove the its proposed defenses to meet the meritorious 
defense standard. See id. at [^29. Rather, "where a party presents a clear and specific 
proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the 
claimant..., it has shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the purposes of its 
motion to set aside a default judgment." Id. 
In Lund, the party seeking to set aside the default pointed to its original complaint 
as providing the defenses to the counterclaim which formed the basis for the default 
judgment. See id. at ^29. The supreme court determined that the allegations in the 
complaint and counterclaim "presented genuine issues of material fact, the resolution of 
which, one way or the other, will necessarily affect each party's ability to recover for its 
own claims." Id. at p 1. Thus, if the allegations in the complaint were proven at trial, the 
party asserting the counterclaims would be precluded from recovering on such claims. 
See id. Therefore, the meritorious defense standard was satisfied. See id. 
In Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., the court reasoned that 
"general denials" in an answer to a complaint would be sufficient to satisfy the 
meritorious defense requirement so long as those denials, if proven at trial, would 
preclude recovery by the plaintiff. 882 P.2d at 1149. According to Erickson, a defense is 
sufficiently meritorious if it is entitled to be tried. See id. Thus, in Erickson, general 
denials in answer to specific allegations in the complaint were sufficient to show a 
meritorious defense, and the court vacated the default judgment and remanded for a trial 
on the merits. See id. 
As set forth in detail below, when the allegations in support of the claims alleged 
in Hernandez's Verified Complaint are reviewed against the defenses and denials 
proffered by Baker, it is clear that Baker has presented a meritorious defense as a matter 
of law. 
1. Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-1 
to -23 (2001), protects consumers from deceptive practices by "suppliers" who regularly 
engage in consumer transactions. See id. § 13-11-4. Generally, to be liable for a 
deceptive practice under the Act, a supplier must have acted knowingly and intentionally 
to deceive the consumer. See id. § 13-11-4(2). 
The essence of Hernandez's claims that Baker violated the Act are that Baker, in 
the course of operating his retail shop, provided an estimate for repairs, then exceeded 
that estimate and performed additional repairs without prior authorization (Verified 
Complaint 1fl[6-9, 10-11) and failed to comply with the repairman's lien statutes in 
retaining and ultimately selling Hernandez's boat. (Verified Complaint ^[12-13, 15-16.) 
Hernandez alleges that Baker's conduct was unconscionable and constituted deceptive 
acts or practices in violation of the Act and, as a result, Hernandez is entitled to damages. 
(Verified Complaint ffi[21-26.) 
In his Answer, Baker denied the allegations set forth above and specifically 
asserted that Performance Auto the corporation had dealings with Hernandez, not Baker 
in his individual capacity. (Answer ^5-26.) Further, Baker submitted an affidavit to the 
trial court in which he testified to the separateness of his personal affairs and the business 
affairs of Performance Auto. (R. 192-97, 280-81.)7 The affidavit also sets forth the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the sale of the boat and trailer and compliance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-2-4. (R. 192-97, 280-87.) 
If proven at trial, Baker's denials would preclude any recovery by Hernandez 
against Baker because Hernandez could not show that Baker, individually, was 
responsible for any of the actions alleged in the Verified Complaint. Further, and at the 
very least, Baker's individual liability creates issues of fact warranting a trial on the 
merits. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (whether the corporate veil should be disregarded creates material issue of 
fact for trial). Additionally, Baker has created material issues of fact regarding whether 
or not the sale of the boat and trailer complied with Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-2-3 and -4. 
See Lund, 2000 UT 75 at *[j31 (allegations which create issue of fact for trial are sufficient 
to satisfy meritorious defense requirement). 
Therefore, Baker has a meritorious defense to Hernandez's first claim. 
7
 A copy of Baker's first and second affidavits are attached as Addendum D. 
2. Replevin 
In support of his claim for replevin, Hernandez alleged that to the extent Baker 
had any continuing control over the boat, Hernandez is entitled to a court order requiring 
Baker to return the boat. (Verified Complaint <|fl[28-29.) 
Baker denied ever having had control or continuing control over the boat (Answer 
ffi[27-30) and again, specifically asserted in his affidavits that he was at all times acting 
for and on behalf of Performance Auto, thereby asserting the corporate shield defense. 
(R. 192-97,280-81.) 
Baker's denials, if proven at trial, would preclude recovery by Hernandez on his 
second claim because Hernandez could not show that Baker wrongfully took or detained 
Hernandez's property or, at the time of the complaint, was presently detaining the same. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(a)-(b) (to recover for replevin plaintiff must show that defendant 
has wrongfully taken and is currently detaining the property of the plaintiff); see also 
Bush v. Bush, 55 Utah 237, 242, 184 P. 823, 825 (1919) (same). Therefore, Baker has a 
meritorious defense to Hernandez's second claim. 
3. Conversion/Trespass to Chattels 
In support of his claim for conversion/trespass to chattels, Hernandez alleged that 
Baker took possession of Hernandez's boat, and despite Hernandez's demands for its 
return, Baker converted it to his own use and otherwise unlawfully disposed of it without 
complying with Utah law. (Verified Complaint ff 32-34.) Baker denied each of these 
allegations and incorporated his corporate shield defense. (Answer ^[31-38.) Further, in 
his affidavits Baker asserts that he was at all times acting for and on behalf of 
Performance Auto and that his personal affairs were kept separate from the corporate 
affairs of Performance Auto. (R. 192-97,280-81.) 
Baker's denials, if proven at trial, would preclude recovery by Hernandez on his 
third claim because Hernandez could not show the necessary elements of his third claim, 
namely that Baker, in his individual capacity, willfully interfered with or otherwise 
intentionally exercised dominion or control over Hernandez's property without lawful 
justification. See Mumford v. ITT Comm. Fine. Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (stating conversion requires showing of willful interference with property 
without lawful justification): cf. Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1002-03 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (where repairman's lien is claimed, liability for conversion creates 
a fact-intensive question). 
Therefore, Baker has a meritorious defense to Hernandez's third claim. 
4. Punitive Damages 
Finally, in support of his claim for punitive damages, Hernandez alleged that 
Baker's conduct was willful, wanton, malicious, and in reckless disregard of Hernandez's 
rights and that he was therefore entitled to punitive damages. (Verified Complaint 1fl[40-
43.) Baker denied these allegations. (Answer ffi[39-43.) 
Punitive damages may only be awarded if compensatory or general damages are 
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the tortfeasor's acts 
or omissions are willful or malicious, intentionally fraudulent, or in reckless indifference 
towards the rights of others. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(l)(a) (2002). 
Baker's denials that he acted in willful, malicious, or reckless disregard of 
Hernandez's rights, if proven at trial, and the fact that Baker denied all substantive 
allegations on the underlying claims alleged by Hernandez, would preclude recovery of 
any punitive damages by Hernandez. Therefore, Baker has a meritorious defense to 
Hernandez's final claim. 
In sum, Baker asserted general denials in his Answer to the Verified Complaint 
and specific defenses of the corporate shield and compliance with the repairman's lien 
statutes, which, if proven at trial, would preclude recovery by Hernandez. Thus, there 
can be no doubt that Baker's denials as set forth in his Answer and the testimony he 
provided in his affidavit meet the requirements for showing a meritorious defense under 
Utah law. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Lund, "there appears little more [Baker] 
realistically could have done, short of proving [his] claims in an evidentiary hearing, to 
'show' the trial court [his] meritorious defense." Lund, 2000 UT 75 at f32. However, 
the law does not require as much. See, e.g., Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1060-61 (Durham, 
J., dissenting) (stating a defendant should not be "put to his proof on his proposed 
defenses nor through the "onerous burden" of a "mini-trial" to show the merits of the 
same). As a result, it is clear that the trial court incorrectly concluded Baker did not have 
a meritorious defense. Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court and remand this 
case for a trial on the merits. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER 
PERFORMANCE AUTO BECAUSE HERNANDEZ NEVER FILED OR 
SERVED THE AMENDED COMPLAINT INCLUDING PERFORMANCE 
AUTO AS A PARTY. 
As stated, although Performance Auto moved to set aside the default judgment for 
lack of jurisdiction, the trial court did not address the issue. Rather, it merely held 
Performance Auto was without a meritorious defense to this action. 
"[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based upon a lack of jurisdiction, the 
district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand 
without denying due process to the one against whom it runs." Vijil, 784 P.2d at 1132 
(Utah 1989); see also Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290-91 (Utah 1986) (holding when 
court lacks jurisdiction judgment is void and must be set aside under Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b)). Furthermore, when a judgment is being attacked as void under Rule 60(b)(4), the 
party attacking the judgment need not meet the standard excuse, timeliness, and 
meritorious defense requirements for setting aside a default judgment. See Garcia, 712 
P.2d at 290-91. 
As set forth above, the facts are clear and undisputed with regard to Performance 
Auto. Performance Auto was not an original party to this action. Hernandez obtained 
leave to file an amended complaint to include Performance Auto as a defendant. 
However, Hernandez never filed the amended complaint nor did he serve Performance 
Auln i,1 illli | ii on.1 - k.'tlliH i, IVi Ionium t \inhi wiu MIIIJII^ ailili ill! I Hit: i.iplioii ul lln 
pleadings as the case moved forward, cumima </ m the trial court's entry of a defai lit 
judgment against it. ' . 
T ^ iii^uagL • ... . . . - .... Su^r> - iw^cuuic, whiLQ governs 
the commencement of eivn auiiL- .! 
jurisdictional prerequisite. See Utah K. t iv. P. 3(b; ^providing, "The court shall have 
^iiisdiction i.oi.. <>. ./.i.w * iiimg ol the complaint or semcc of the summons and a copy 
(discussing Utah R. Civ. P. 3.).8 
liuie J iiidiwS no distinction between the filing of an original complaint or an 
j n r i n I oiiipL.'il \\w !\• J111;' ,,!• nldiliwii,1! o Inula'" 11•• leni, authorities consiaLVM? 
Rule 3 in a context similar to the facts in the instant case do not reeogni/v ; 
For example, in Donner v. Sulcus Computer Corp.. 103 F R.D. 548 (N.D. Pa. 1984), the 
mil held thnl imu-iulmrnl d «i complaint I: > nul u l ' i c r . -c .wstu that complaint is actually 
filed with the court. See id. at W) (considering Fed i^1 < '«••• I1 Il 
Similarly, Professors Vvright and Miller, in their oil cited treatise, state; * \i 
nm\wYix,x,\i a » agaiii,-.! an uduiijohal JeienduLi L.^necim an amended complaint 
as of the date of filing the amended complaint, rather tlmti the AwU* \ >f 1hc mm fs \ i iler 
Though Rule 3(b) provides for jurisdiction upon filing "or sen . ^ „ . ice without filing would be 
a meaningless act insofar as an action must be dismissed if a com1 ^ *• fl1*^1 within 10 days of 
'service. See Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a); see also Dipoma, 2001 UT 61 .
 t ming same). Thus, 
even though Hernandez failed to serve Performance Auto, the failure r^  f :e the amended complaint 
renders any claim of actual notice in lieu of service moot. 
granting leave to amend the complaint." Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1052 n.l (3d ed. 2002) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). 
Indeed, it seems elementary that, upon obtaining leave to amend a complaint, the 
plaintiff is required to thereafter file and serve that amended complaint. Until the 
plaintiff completes these necessary requirements, his amended complaint is nothing more 
than a proposal, having no force or effect of law. Rule 15, which governs the 
requirements for amended and supplemental pleadings, also supports this conclusion. 
Rule 15 does not specifically provide for or reference a filing requirement as a 
condition precedent to the effectiveness of an amended pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
15(a). However, in Nelson v. Adams, USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000), the United States 
Supreme Court held that Rule 15 assumes an amended pleading will be filed as a 
prerequisite to its effectiveness. See id. at 465. 
In Nelson, the Supreme Court considered federal rule 15 with regard to an issue 
and facts similar to the instant case. In Nelson, the defendant was awarded attorney fees 
against the plaintiff corporation. See id. at 462. The defendant feared that the 
corporation would be unable to pay its attorney fees award and obtained leave under Rule 
15 to amend its pleading to include the Donald Nelson, the corporation's sole shareholder 
and president, as a party. See id. at 463-64. 
Although the defendant obtained leave to amend, it never served Nelson with the 
amended pleading, nor did it file the same with the trial court. See id. at 466. However, 
the trial court, upon granting leave to amend, simultaneously amended the judgment and 
subjet ted Nelson (n nitli1 ideal ii,ihilii\ tin me aimim y ices, See id, at IIKI n i I lie' 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Nelson 
had suffered no prejudice because the original judgment was against his own corporation. 
See ra. „ >. 
On appeal, (lie Niipivni I 'mill irviTsrd. See id. a! Ill"' Hie ( " iiiil leasumnl, 
"Rule 15 assumes an amended pleading will be filed and anticipates service of that 
pleading on the adverse party.M Id, at 465, Because the amended pleading was never 
against Nelson violated his right to due process under Rule 15. See id. at 467. 
V\ Tiile the above cited authorities consider Rules ? - f 1 c ->f the Federal Rules .*f 
< "i\ il h 'mvdmr Idliiteipielaliuii1 d line h/deia! Ki . C L . _ are persuasive 
where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar ' to the federal rules," 
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 U T 54, f 7 n.2, 53 P.2d 94? (quoting ' • 
nun. • . . .. ...v* . iiviicatc Uiat 




 R C i \ . P . ) r C o m p i l e r ' s N - -
:. i:sure persuasive when considered in connection with 
Utah case law no* ~vn\r\? the effect of filing an amended pleading In I canisters, . 
Chauffeurs,~ ien & Helpers, Local Union 222 v. Motor Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 
x. idi - v. ,iii mpieiiu, Court stated, '' I 'he law is overwhelming to the effect that 
w ln i i an amended inmpl.tiii l h tiled, line (mine! inpliiinl e, hem tie, u l i i uu ami 
cannot be used for any purpose." Id. at 808; see also Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 
85,1J13, 69 P.3d 286 (stating "amended pleading supercedes original pleading, and 
original pleading performs no function" (citation omitted)). 
Insofar as the filing of an amended complaint supercedes the original, it 
necessarily follows that an amended complaint serves no function or purpose until it is 
actually filed with the clerk of court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5(e) (defining "filing" as "with 
the clerk of the court"). Thus, the only effective complaint in the instant case is the 
original Verified Complaint, which names only Baker individually. 
In sum, the weight of authority on the issue is clear—because Hernandez failed to 
file and serve an amended complaint including Performance Auto as a party to this 
action, the trial court was without jurisdiction over Performance Auto as a matter of law. 
As a result, the entry of default judgment against Performance Auto is void and should 
have been set aside under Rule 60(b)(4). Therefore, the trial court must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request this Court reverse the 
trial court's entry of default judgment and remand the case for a trial on the merits. 
P espectii illy submitted this J^ f ") da> . - y 2uu4. 
M '" T Pattison 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Heath H. Snow 
BARNEY & MCKENNA, P.C. 
63 South 300 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84771-2710 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 26(b), I, Bryan J. Pattison, certify that on 
January 2>&, 2004,1 served two (2) copies of Appellants' BRIEF OF APPELLANTS upon 
counsel for Appellee in this matter, via first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid, to 
the following address: 
Thomas P. Isom 
1199 West 700 South 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Bryain. Pattison 
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KELLY S. BAKER, d.b.a. 
Performance Auto & Marine Supply, : 
PERFORMANCE AUTO & MARINE 
SUPPLY CORP. and DOES II THROUGH : 
Defendants. : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AN 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Supporting Order Denying Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment and Motion to 
Enforce July 31,2001 Order) 
Case No. 980900225 
ineivioi. 
defendants Kelly S. Baker and Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corporat h :i n has 1:i e e 1:1 
si lbmitted to the Court 'for decision pursuant-to Rule 4-5(31, C J A I la \ ing^ : i i i - = i ill lyconside. i: • : • I 
said moliuris, the < "ourl nn v III/IIM'S <m<l nnlcrs tlirt following findings of fact rind conclusions of 
law: 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of CI vil Procedure t>ll(h|, in oidti lui lite Cum 1 to set aside a 
ripfmill judgment the defendants must show: 1) the default judgment was entered based upon 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 2) the motion to set aside is timely; and,. 3) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deg5*eiSrk 
that defendants have a meritorious defense to the underlying action. State bv & through D. of 
SS. v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). 
Under Musselman, in order for a defense to be meritorious it must "set forth specific and 
sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the 
one entered," Id. Based upon that standard the Court concludes that the defendants have failed 
to provide "specific" and "detailed" facts necessary to support their underlying claim and 
therefore are unable to set forth the necessary evidence of a meritorious defense to the action 
against them. 
Accordingly, the defendants1 Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Motion to 
Enforce July 31,2001 Order should be denied. 
ENTERED this l> day of /4>**i^^ . 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Stephei^^H&nriod -'}\ 
District to^*Jttdgef^ 
Approved as to form: 
Heath H. Snow 
Attorney for the defendants 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration, the 
forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLawjwzre sent by mail to opposing counsel at the 
address appearing below on the \ \r* day of ( , ) ^ 2003: 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
Heath H. Snow 
Daren Barney 
BARNEY & McKENNA, P C. 
63 South 300 East, Suite 202 
P.O. Box 2710 
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GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
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Performance Auto & Marine 
Supply, and JOHN DOES 
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• : 'COMES NOW. Plair - FERNANDEZ Il ] ; , ! 1! i ,1 j : r , gill: , 11 J , 
attorney, Guy complains of Defendant, KELLli 
BAKER, dba Performance Auto & Marine Supply, as follows: 
GENERAL 3 k¥ERMENT8 
n
 Plaintiff is a bona fi de and actual resident of 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
ate 
of Utah, .* doing business as Performance Auto & Marine 
Supply i n Sat* r — bounty, Fit ate of Utah. 
3 jurisaic,ioi i and venu ^ matter is proper in' 
the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
FIRST CLAIM 
(Violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act) 
4. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the 
averments in paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Complaint. 
5. Defendant operates a retail shop which repairs 
boats called Performance Auto & Marine Supply. 
6. Said retail repair shop' is located at 6321 South 
Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
I. On or about August 1, 1996, Plaintiff contaced 
Defendant regarding certain repairs to a 1981 Sunset Runabout 21' 
board /BT209465 and hull number TKB00119M81D, and his trailer, a 
1981 Maynard, model 100k, plate /0B671J, serial /TW109. 
8. Defendant orally estimated that the total cost of 
repair to be $250.00. 
9. Based upon the oral repair estimate, Plaintiff left 
the boat with Defendant for repair. 
10. Without obtaining any additional verbal 
authorization from Plaintiff for additional repairs, Defendant 
subsequently presented Plaintiff with an invoice for $834.72 in 
alleged repairs. 
II. Defendant did not obtain any written authorization 
from Plaintiff to perform the additional repairs. 
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12. Plaintiff offered to pay and actually tendered the 
original estimate amount of $250.00, but Defendant refused to 
accept the payment, but instead demanded the entire $834.72 
invoice amount. 
13. Defendant also refused to release Plaintiff's boat, 
but instead retained possession of the boat and asserted a claim 
for a repairman's lien on the boat. 
14. At the time of this incident, Defendant did not 
have a sign posted at his repair shop indicating Plaintiff's 
right, upon request, to obtain a written estimate of repair 
costs. 
15. If Defendant had posted such a sign at his shop, 
Plaintiff would have requested a written estimate before having 
the work performed. 
16. Sometime prior to November 9, 1995, Defendant sold 
Plaintiff's boat without any prior notice to Plaintiff and 
without complying with one or more of the requirements of 38-2-4. 
17. On or about November 9, 1995, Plaintiff's attorney 
at that time, Dennis V. Dahle of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
contacted Defendant regarding the wrongful sale of the boat. 
18. In said letter, Plaintiff's attorney made an 
additional written demand for the return of Plaintiff's boat. 
3 
19. On or about November 10, 1995, Defendant, through 
his attorney, Daniel Bay Gibbons, stated that the boat had been 
sold and attempted to tender a check to Plaintiff in the hope of 
reaching an accord and satisfaction. 
20. Plaintiff refused to accept the offered accord and 
satisfaction. 
21. Defendant's conduct, as described in this Complaint 
and as may be further presented at trial, was unconscionable, in 
violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
22. Defendant's actions in this case, as described in 
this Complaint, and as may be further presented at trial, 
constituted deceptive acts or practices, in violation of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
23. Plaintiff has been damaged and has suffered a loss 
as a result of Defendant's unconscionable conduct and deceptive 
acts and practices, which loss includes, without limitation, the 
fair rental value of the boat during the time Defendant deprived 
him thereof, or the entire value of the boat, in excess of 
$8,500.00 in the event Plaintiff is unable to recover the boat 
from Defendant, and such other damages as may be proven at trial 
or adduced during discovery. 
24. Pursuant to the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant for his 
4 
actual damages or $2,000.00, whichever is greater, plus court 
costs. 
25. Pursuant to the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant for his 
reasonable attorney fee incurred in this matter. 
26. Plaintiff is entitled to such other and further 
relief as is just and equitable in the premises. 
SECOND CLAIM 
(Replevin) 
27. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the 
averments in paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint. 
28. To the extent Defendant has any continuing control 
over Plaintiff's boat, or to the extent that other Defendants are 
discovered who have possession of Plaintiff's boat but are not 
good faith purchasers of the boat, Plaintiff is entitled to 
replevin of the boat from such persons. 
29. In such event, Plaintiff is entitled to an order 
from the court requiring Defendant or other persons in control of 
the boat to immediately return the boat to Plaintiff. 
30. Plaintiff is entitled to such other and further 
relief as is just and equitable in the premises. 
5 
THIRD CLAIM 
(Conversion/Trespass to Chattels) 
31. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the 
averments in paragraphs 1 through 30 of this Complaint. 
32. On or before November 9, 1995, Defendant took 
possession of a boat and trailer belonging to Plaintiff. 
33. Despite demand by Plaintiff, Defendant refused to 
return the boat and trailer belonging to Plaintiff. 
34. Defendant has converted said boat and trailer to 
his own use, or has unlawfully disposed of such property without 
compliance with Utah law. 
35. As a result of Defendant's conversion and use of 
the boat and trailer, Plaintiff has been harmed and has suffered 
damages as previously stated in this complaint. 
36. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant 
for all damages suffered as a result of Defendant's conversion of 
the boat and trailer. 
37. Alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
against Defendant for all damages suffered as a result of 
Defendant's trespass to his chattels. 
38. Plaintiff is entitled to such other and further 




39. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the 
averments in paragraphs 1 through 38 of this Complaint. 
40. The aforementioned conduct of the Defendant was 
willful, wanton, malicious, and were doing with reckless 
disregard for the rights of Plaintiff. 
41. Defendant's conduct otherwise justifies an award of 
punitive damages. 
42. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive 
damages against Defendant in the sum of not less than $25,000.00. 
43. Plaintiff is entitled to such other relief and 
judgment as is just and equitable in the premises. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, MARK HERNANDEZ, prays for judgment 
against Defendant, KELLY S. BAKER, dba Performance Auto & Marine 
Supply, as follows: 
1. For a judgment pursuant to the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act in a sum equal to Plaintiff's actual damages 
suffered herein or $2,000.00, whichever is greater. 
2. For a judgment pursuant to the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act for Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
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3. For a writ of replevin requiring Defendant and any 
other person who is not a bona fide purchaser to iiomediately 
return Plaintiff's boat and trailer to Plaintiff. 
4. For a judgment against Defendant for damages as a 
result of Defendant's conversion of Plaintiff's property or for 
Defendant's trespass to Plaintiff's chattels. 
5. For a judgment against Defendant for punitive 
damages in the sum of not less than $25;000.00, or such other 
greater sum as may be proven at trial. 
6. For such other relief and judgment as is just and 
equitable in the premises. / 
DATED this 31 day of f)<^<^Aj-*^^ 
GUY L. BLACK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff/s Address; 
281 East 600 North 
Provo, Utah 84606 
8 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
S 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, MARK HERNANDEZ, and having been 
first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the plaintiff in 
the above-entitled action, that he has read the foregoing 
Verified Complaint and voluntarily executed the same, and that he 
knows the contents thereof to be true, except as to those items 
stated on information, and believes those items to be true. 
i )27lN.5UCW.OT8m.UI M057 I 
My Commission Expires: 
9 
TabC 
Daniel Bay Gibbons (#4837) 
Attorney for Defendant Kelly Baker 
6375 Highland Drive, Suite B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 272-8101 
Fax:(801)272-0467 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK HERNANDEZ, : 
: ANSWER TO VERIFIED 
Plaintiff, : COMPLAINT 
vs. : Civil No. 980900225 
KELLY S. BAKER, dba Performance Auto : Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
& Marine Supply, and JOHN DOES I : 
THROUGH X„ : 
Defendants. 
Defendant Kelly Baker ("Baker"), by and through his attorney, Daniel Bay Gibbons, 
answers the separately numbered paragraphs of the Verified Complaint of Plaintiff Mark 
Hernandez ("Hernandez") as follows: 
1. Deny for lack of information or belief. 
2. Admit that Baker is a resident of Salt Lake County, and otherwise deny. 
3. Admit. 
4. Baker incorporates his answers to paragraphs 1 through 3 of the Verified 
Complaint 
5. Deny. 
6. Admit that Performance Auto & Marine Supply Corp., a Utah corporation, may 
have had business dealings with Hernandez, and otherwise deny, and specifically deny that Baker 
in his individual capacity had any dealings whatsoever with Hernandez. 
7. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
8. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
9. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
10. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
11. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
12. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
13. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
14. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
15. Deny for lack of information or belief. 
16. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
17. Admit that Hernandez's various attorneys have made contact with Baker or 
Baker's attorneys over the years complaining of alleged acts or omissions of Performance Auto 
- 2 -
& Marine Corp., a Utah corporation, deny for lack of information or belief any particular contact 
made on November 9,1995, and otherwise deny. 
18. Admit that any such letter will speak for itself, and otherwise deny. 
19. Admit that on or about November 10,1995 Mr. Gibbons, acting as attorney for 
Performance Auto & Marine Corp., a Utah corporation, tendered a check to Hernandez, that the 
check and letter of tender speak for themselves, and otherwise deny, and specifically deny that 
Mr. Gibbons made such tender on behalf of Baker. 
20. Admit that Hernandez refused to accept the tender of Performance Auto & Marine 







27. Baker incorporates his answers to paragraphs 1 through 26 of the Verified 
Complaint. 
28. Deny that Baker ever had control or has continuing control over the subject boat, 




31. Baker incorporates his answers to paragraphs 1 through 30 of the Verified 
Complaint. 
32. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
33. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 
34. Deny. See answer to paragraph 6. 











WHEREFORE, Baker asks that the Court dismiss this action as against Baker, that 
Plaintiff take nothing by way of his Complaint, and that Baker be awarded his costs and 
attorneys fees in defending this action. 
DATED this of February, 2000. 
Defendant's Address: 
Kelly Baker 
2209 Fardown Ave. 
Holladay.UT 84121 
Daniel Bay Gibbons, 
Attorney for Defendant 
-5-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this 9th day of February, 20001 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Answer to Verified Complaint, to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Thomas P. Isom, Esq. 
7321 South State Street, Suiie A 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
An additional copy of said document was also faxed to Mr. Isom at 562-1350. 
U^a*/ 
TabD 
BARNEY & McKENNA, P.C. 
HEATH H. SNOW-8563 
DAREN BARNEY - 6824 
Attorneys for Defendant 
63 South 300 East, Suite 202 
P.O. Box 2710 
St. George, Utah 84771-2710 
(435)628-1711 
(435) 628-3318 fax 
www.barnev-mck:enna.com 
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KELLY S. BAKER, dba Performance Auto 
& Marine Supply, PERFORMANCE AUTO 
& MARINE SUPPLY CORP. and DOES E 
THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KELLY BAKER 
Civil No.: 980900225 
Judge: Stephen L. Henroid 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
KELLY BAKER, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of majority and competent to testify. 
2. I am a Defendant in, and have knowledge of the above-captioned case. 
3. On or about November 20,1990, Defendant, Performance Auto & Marine 
Supply, Corporation (hereinafter "Performance") filed articles of incorporation and 
registered as a legal corporation with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-101 et seq (Utah Revised Business 
Corporations Act). 
4. At all times since its organization as a corporation, I have been a 
shareholder and President of Performance. 
5. Since its organization as a corporation, I have kept all corporate 
formalities and have bifurcated my personal affairs from the affairs of Performance, 
6. Sometime in 1996 or 1997, Plaintiff, Mark Hernandez (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff) brought to Performance's store, a boat and trailer and asked that Performance 
complete certain repairs on the boat and its engine. 
7. Thereafter, Performance carried out said request by supplying labor and 
parts to repair Plaintiffs boat. 
8. Upon completing said repairs, Performance requested that Plaintiff pay for 
said labor and parts which Plaintiff wholly failed or refused to do so. 
9. After several months and repeated requests for payment with no response 
from Plaintiff, Performance exercised its repairman's lien rights pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-2-3 and sold the boat and trailer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-4 to 
recoup its parts, labor and storage costs. 
10. As an act of good faith and commercial reasonableness, Performance cut a 
check, and caused it to be mailed to Plaintiff, for the difference between sale proceeds 
and the costs of parts, labor and storage. 
11. Sometime prior to January 9, 1998, Plaintiff filed a complaint against me 
in the 4 District Court in and for Utah County, seeking return of the boat and trailer 
under the theory of conversion or in the alternative money damages. 
12. On or about January 9, 1998, after I had legal counsel enter a limited 
appearance and file a motion for change of venue, the case was transferred to this court. 
13. I was served with a copy of the complaint and summons on or about, 
January 20,2000. 
14. On or about February 11, 2000,1 caused my counsel to file an answer to 
Plaintiffs complaint with the court wherein I asserted as an affirmative defense the fact 
that I was not the proper party in interest in this case, but rather the corporation, 
Performance, of which I was a principal. 
15. On or about September 21, 2000, after more than 7 months of no action, 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave of Court To Amend its Complaint and add 
Performance. 
16. I am informed that, although Plaintiffs Motion for Leave of Court was 
granted on December 5,2000, Plaintiff never filed an amended complaint. 
17. To the best of my knowledge Performance was never served with an 
amended complaint and summons, nor did I authorize my counsel at the time, Daniel 
Gibbons (hereinafter "Mr. Gibbons") to accept service on behalf of Performance. 
18. It is my understanding that on or about June 25, 2001, after another 7 
months of inaction by Plaintiff, the court, sua sponte, issued an Order to Show Cause as 
to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
19. Shortly before the July 25, 2001, Order to Show Cause was issued, 
Plaintiffs served Mr.Gibbons with discovery requests. 
20. It is my understanding that on or about July 31, 2001, this court held a 
hearing on its Order to Show Cause at which counsel for Plaintiff, Tom Isom, was 
present. 
21. It is my understanding that at the July 31, 2001, Order to Show Cause 
Hearing, Plaintiff was ordered to file a motion to compel discovery or a certificate of 
readiness for trial within 30 days of the hearing "or the case would be dismissed without 
further notice" 
22. After confirming that Plaintiff had taken no action for over 30 days, Mr. 
Gibbons notified me in a letter that the matter would be dismissed by the court in its due 
course. 
23. After receiving Mr. Gibbons letter, I contacted Mr. Gibbons, by phone and 
discussed the fact that the case would be dismissed by the court in its due course, without 
Mr. Gibbons having to take any affirmative action. 
24. Based on the court's order, Plaintiffs inaction, and the advise of Mr. 
Gibbons, I thought that the cased was essentially over. Accordingly, I did not have any 
further communications with Mr. Gibbons and I did not inform Mr. Gibbons that I had 
moved to St. George, Utah. 
25. It is my understanding that on or about November 8, 2001, Plaintiff filed, 
and the court accepted, a Motion to Compel discovery responses. 
26. It is my understanding that copies of the Motion to Compel, and its 
accompanying documents, were served upon Mr. Gibbons, who had been appointed and 
sworn in as a Justice Court Judge in the City of Holladay, thus causing him to close his 
law office and maintain a very small law practice from his home. 
27. It is my understanding that on or about January 25, 2002, Mr. Gibbons 
sent a letter to Performances' old business address of 6321 Highland Drive, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, wherein he attempted to inform me of the pending Motion to Compel. 
28. I never received the January 25,2002, letter. 
29. It is my understanding that on or about July 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed and 
served upon Mr. Gibbons a Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment. 
30. It is my understanding that on or about July 25, 2002, Mr. Gibbons sent a 
letter to Performances' old business address informing me of Plaintiff's pending Motion 
for Entry of Default and Default Judgment. 
31. Again, I never received the July 25,2002, letter. 
32. It is my understanding that on or about August 23, 2002, the court granted 
Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment and ordered an evidentiary 
hearing on damages. 
33. It is my understanding that on or about September 27, 2002, the court held 
and evidentiary hearing where Plaintiff requested and obtained an award of punitive 
damages in the amount of $25,000.00. 
34. It is my understanding that on or about February 14, 2003, after Plaintiffs 
submitted its affidavit of attorneys fees and costs, the court entered Judgment against me 
personally and Performance in the amount of $52,677.75. 
35. On or about March 27, 2003, I was served with a Writ of Execution 
against my personal residence and documents evidencing the fact that the February 14, 
2003, judgment had been abstracted into Washington County, State of Utah. 
36. Between the time I last communicated with Mr. Gibbons around August or 
September of 2001 and the time I was served with the Writ of Execution on March 27, 
2003, I had no idea that the case had not been dismissed and that in fact a $52,677.75 
judgment had been entered against me and Performance. 
37. Had I known that the above-captioned case was not dismissed by the court 
after the July 31, 2001, hearing or that the court was not going to dismiss the case on its 
own initiative, I would have stayed in contact with Mr. Gibbons and retained he or 
another attorneys services to defend myself, just as I had done for the first 2 Vz years after 
Plaintiffs complaint was filed. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this £ 3 _ day of April, 2003. 
JLY BAKER, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO (or affirmed) before me this $3$ day of April, 
2003, by Kelly Raker.. , 
NOTARY PDBBJC 
My Commission Expires: 7-/3-0 j 
Address: tt\3Uh/f>. / IT 
ST.ATEOFT1TAW 
BARNEY & McKENNA, P.C. 
HEATH H. SNOW-8563 
DAREN BARNEY - 6824 
Attorneys for Defendant 
63 South 300 East, Suite 202 
P.O. Box 2710 
St. George, Utah 84771-2710 
(435)628-1711 
(435) 628-3318 fax 
www.baniev-mckenna.com 
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KELLY S. BAKER, dba Performance Auto 
& Marine Supply, PERFORMANCE AUTO 
& MARINE SUPPLY CORP. and DOES H 
THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF KELLY BAKER 
Civil No.: 980900225 
Judge: Stephen L. Henroid 
) 
)ss: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
KELLY BAKER, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of majority and competent to testify. 
2. I am a Defendant in, and have knowledge of the above-captioned case. 
3. Since its organization as a corporation, I have kept all corporate 
formalities and have bifurcated my personal affairs from the affairs of Performance Auto 
& Marine Supply, Corp. (hereinafter "Performance"). 
4. Contrary to Plaintiffs affidavit, Performance included the abbreviation 
"Corp." in all signage, advertisements (including the phone directories), business 
invoices and letterhead/envelopes in an effort to place customers and third-persons on 
notice of the fact that Performance was a corporation, created and existing under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
5. After further research, I believe that sometime in 1995 (instead of 1996 or 
1997 stated in my previous affidavit) I was first contacted by Plaintiff Mark Hernandez 
(hereinafter "Plaintiff) who wanted me to give him a quote for the cost of installing a 
motor in a boat for him. 
6. It is my recollection and belief that I quoted the Plaintiff a cost of $250 for 
installing a fully assembled, working motor with all parts, into his boat. 
7. Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff delivered the boat and trailer to 
Performance's shop, without the motor. 
8. Plaintiff informed me that the motor was being put together by someone 
else and that he would have it delivered when assembly was completed. 
9. Approximately one week later, Plaintiff contacted me and asked that I give 
him a quote to assemble the motor. 
10. After learning that the motor was a Chevrolet 350 V-8 engine with one 
head in place, I gave Plaintiff a price and made it clear that the price was contingent that 
the motor was as he described, when it was delivered. 
11. When the motor was delivered it not as described. Engine parts were just 
thrown into boxes. During assembly it was discovered by myself or Performance 
employees that numerous parts, gaskets and the carburetor were missing and the oil pump 
had the pickup tube lose in the bottom of the oil pan. 
12. Because of the missing parts and additional problems, the assembly and 
installation of the motor took longer than expected. 
13. Each time missing parts or new problems were discovered, myself or 
employees of Performance attempted to reach Plaintiff by phone at the contact number he 
left with Performance. 
14. Depending on whether Plaintiff returned our calls or whether he just 
showed up at the store, work would stop until Plaintiff was informed of the problem and 
he consented to the additional costs. 
15. On a couple of occasions Plaintiff stated that he would obtain some of the 
specific missing parts himself, which he did, with additional delay. 
16. The fact that the motor and the boat was not as Plaintiff had represented 
was the reason for additional repair costs and delays. 
17. I never made any comment to the effect that I would get to his boat when I 
got to it because I had given him such a good deal. 
18. When the assembly and installation of the motor was completed I 
attempted to reach Plaintiff several times at the contact number he left with Performance, 
to no avail. 
19. The contact number Plaintiff gave Performance was neither his home 
telephone nor his business telephone. The number Plaintiff gave Performance was to 
another business where Plaintiff could be found at times. 
20. For several months I tried to contact Plaintiff but was told each time by the 
person answering that they did not know whereabouts of Plaintiff. I left several messages 
to the effect that the boat was ready to be picked up. 
21. It was Performance's normal business practice (as evidenced by a sign 
posted on the wall within its store) that any vehicle or boat that was left at Performance 
after 30 days of the repairs being completed would be considered abandoned and sold. 
22. After several of months of no contact with Plaintiff, Performance ran an 
add in the newspaper for a couple of weeks advertising the sale of the boat and trailer. 
23. Performance could not give Plaintiff any notice of said intended sale as he 
had not given a physical address to mail notice nor had Plaintiff returned my calls. 
24. Performance would eventually sell the boat and trailer to an individual for 
$3,000.00. 
25. Only after Performance had sold the boat and trailer did Plaintiff make 
contact with me and demanded return of the boat and trailer. 
26. After discussing the matter with Plaintiff, I felt bad about the 
misunderstanding and the turn of events so I attempted to contact the buyer of the boat 
and trailer to see if I could give him his purchase money back in exchange for a return of 
the boat and trailer. 
27. Based on the fact that boat and trailer had previously been sold at a 
Sheriffs sale, thus causing registration problems, the buyer agreed to "unravel" the sale 
and return the boat to Performance in exchange for a return of his purchase money. 
28. After learning of this possibility, I spoke with Plaintiff and informed him 
that I could probably secure the return of his boat and trailer but that he would need to 
pay the outstanding repair bill and storage fees owed to Performance, which was in 
excess of $800.00. 
29. Plaintiff immediately denied the offer and said that he was retaining an 
attorney to sue me. 
30. Based on Plaintiffs response, I had Performance's attorney, Mr. Daniel 
Gibbons, send a letter and a check to the Plaintiff dated November 10, 1995, offering to 
pay him the difference between his repair bill and the proceeds from the sale of the boat 
and trailer. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto, marked "Exhibit A" 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
31. Shortly after having Mr. Gibbons send this letter and check on behalf of 
Performance (not myself) I received a demand letter from an attorney retained by 
Plaintiff dated November 9, 1995, a true and correct copy of the November 9, 1995, 
demand letter is attached hereto, marked "Exhibit B," and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
32. After receiving the November 9, 1995, demand letter and based on 
counsel I received from Mr. Gibbons, I caused the sale to be "unraveled" and obtained a 
return of the boat and trailer. 
33. After not obtaining payment for the repair and storage bill owed to 
Performance for over a year and seeing that attempts to resolve the matter with Plaintiff 
were fruitless, Performance decided to dispose of the boat and trailer pursuant to 
repairman lien statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-2-3 and 38-2-4). 
34. Accordingly, Performance had Mr. Gibbons attempt to give proper notice 
of the intended sale to Plaintiff on November 18,1996, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-
2-4. A true and correct copy of the November 18, 1996 notice of sale is attached hereto, 
marked "Exhibit C" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
35. To the best of my knowledge, the November 18, 1996, notice of sale 
included all of the information required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-4 including the date, 
time and location of the sale as well as the amount for which Plaintiff could redeem the 
boat and trailer prior to sale ($3,185.57). 
36. I must surmise that Plaintiff received a copy of the November 18, 1996, 
notice of sale by the fact that he included it as an exhibit to his recently filed 
memorandum in opposition. 
37. Plaintiff failed to redeem the boat and trailer prior to the sale date. 
Accordingly, the boat was sold to the highest bidder for an amount less than $3,185.57 at 
the date, time and location specified in the November 18,1996, notice of sale. 
38. In December of 1996 I was served with a copy of the Summons and 
Verified Complaint which asserted causes of action against me personally, not against 
Performance. 
39. After being served with process in December of 1996, I retained the 
services of Mr. Gibbons to represent me personally. Mr. Gibbons timely filed a Rule 
12(b)(3) motion for change of venue. 
40. Mr. Gibbons did not file an answer wherein it would be proper to raise the 
failure to join an indispensable party defense and the fact that Performance was a 
corporation. 
41. After Mr. Gibbons filed the Rule 12(b)(3) Plaintiff allowed the case to 
languish for almost TWO YEARS without doing anything until he filed his own motion 
for change of venue which my attorney, Mr. Gibbons, did not contest. 
42. It is my understanding that after the case was removed to this Court that 
Plaintiff was ordered to reserve me. I was served with a copy of the complaint and 
summons on or about, January 20,2000. 
43. On or about February 11, 2000,1 caused my counsel to file an answer to 
Plaintiffs complaint with this Court wherein I asserted as an affirmative defense citing 
the fact that I was not the proper party in interest in this case, but rather the corporation, 
Performance, of which I was a principal. 
44. On or about September 21, 2000, after more than 7 MONTHS of no 
action, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave of Court To Amend its Complaint and add 
Performance. 
45. I am informed that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave of Court was granted on 
December 5, 2000, however it is my understanding that Plaintiff never filed an amended 
complaint. 
46. It is my understanding that on or about June 25,2001, after another 
16 MONTHS of inaction by Plaintiff, the court, sua sponte, issued an Order to Show 
Cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
47. Shortly before the July 25, 2001, Order to Show Cause was issued, 
Plaintiffs served Mr.Gibbons with discovery requests. 
48. It is my understanding that on or about July 31, 2001, this court held a 
hearing on its Order to Show Cause at which counsel for Plaintiff, Tom Isom, was 
present. 
49. It is my understanding that at the July 31, 2001, Order to Show Cause 
Hearing, Plaintiff was ordered to file a motion to compel discovery or a certificate of 
readiness for trial within 30 days of the hearing "or the case would be dismissed without 
further notice" A true and correct copy of the Court's docket and minute entry is 
attached hereto, marked "Exhibit D," and incorporated herein by this reference. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this y day of June, 2003. 
KEll/T BAKER^ffiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR T^ TO (or affirmed) before me t h i s ^ f f a y of June, 2003 
by Kflly B<dcen 
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